Iceland & The EU Fisheries Bind

Publius reminds us all that if Iceland doesn't move to join the EU, it will largely be because the EU's fisheries policy is a disaster.

That may be so, but the British, Irish and Danes have all kinds of exemptions. Why not a fisheries exemption for Iceland? Then you may ask: why stop there? Why indeed? There are good arguments for a salad bar EU. If we could get rid of the UK rebate in return for a UK exemption from CAP subsidisation, we should do so tomorrow...

It would be even better if we could have a decent fisheries policy. Unfortunately that is a difficult proposition, for reasons explained in the recent Ecorys EU spending study (.pdf) for the Commission:

As a relatively small group, the fisheries industry is able to form a strong lobby. Similar to farmers, the small size of the group lessens the problems of collective action (as defined by Olson, 1969); which increases the effectiveness of their lobbying activities. Contrary to the budget related lobbying of farmers, fishermen would initially lobby for an increased fish quota. Where lobbying for income transfers may raise opposition from voters, turning a blind eye in relation to fish quotas would probably not have such consequences; on the contrary. For example, Daw and Gray (2005) quote Pirzio-Biroli (Chef de Cabinet to Franz Fischler): “politicians … are faced with the fishing lobby and there are always elections taking place. As a result, politics always ‘gets in the way’ of sustainable fisheries management. Economic hardship and unemployment caused by cutbacks are high-profile issues, eagerly reported by the Press and easily blamed on the actions of a Fisheries Minister.”

The credibility of cooperative efforts by Member States to deal with the fisheries problem is unlikely. Firstly, because of the selection principle as described above (see also Jensen, 1999); secondly, because national governments run the risk of being captured by lobby groups, and thus lose sight of the common objectives; and thirdly, because there is too much heterogeneity in terms of the size of the fisheries industry (both in absolute terms, as well as relative to GDP). This will obstruct agreement on common terms.

The fact that Iceland has managed its fisheries well is also due to its geographical position: it does not have to manage a sea bordered by 7 (let alone 21) states; it has a well cut-out exclusive economic zone not contiguous with that of many other nations.

The diagnosis of the problem in the EU, which is institutional and near-impossible to overcome, does not need to map clearly unto the cure. That is, we can probably do a lot outside of setting and enforcing effective catch restrictions, a task we fail at every year.

Such things could include: a reduction of information requirements on small fishermen, a (low) cap on price support measures, banning the discarding of bycatch, and terminating funds for the 'modernisation' of the fishing fleet. This would go some way to reverse the heavy tilt towards industrial trawlers EU rules have introduced to the market, and on the long run it will create more jobs and increase the amount of fish that can be caught.

But even this kind of tinkering at the margin apparently runs into coordinated protest by industrial fishermen, and will be scuttled by Certain Unnamed Member States. So there needs to be more counteracting coordinated protest. Will citizens start caring before the stocks collapse?