I have a short post up on the Atlantic Review on a recent policy paper by Nick Whitney, for the European Council on Foreign Relations, that deals with the topic of European defence integration. See 'The State of European Defence Integration'
Whitney is a former head of the European Defence Agency, so he has some expertise on the topic. The paper confirms some of the arguments made in the post on European Geopolitics, particularly the absence of a common strategy and the politicised nature of missions.
One conclusion Whitney draws is that the European Union has not managed to learn from the problems it encountered on earlier missions, because it has been too eager to call these missions a success. This reflects their use to further integration -- they are part of a 'functionalist' integration strategy.
Another objection Whitney raises is that most EU missions so far have been very safe, engaged in only in the framework of the United Nations, or after the United Nations had already prepared the ground. This is probably mostly due to an unwillingness to put troops in harm's way, but also reflects the use of these missions to further integration.
Of course we want EU missions to strive to achieve success, but an excessive focus on building integration through good experiences with missions can mean that the EU will engage in operations that provide little in terms of our security, and could as well be done by others, while failing to engage in vital but more risky missions.
Whitney is rather focused on the EU acting to intervene in failed or failing states. I am sceptical of this interventionism, but it's currently often being done anyway, and at least Whitney proposes that we should have a strategy. An actual, coherent common strategy would be a big step forward, especially towards Africa and the Middle East.
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3 comments:
Not sure that going in where the UN has prepared the ground is just "taking on easy missions." There's also the issue in an environment dominated by dubious interventions in Iraq that at least going in after the UN suggests there is some actual legitimacy to the action.
And this is a central problem, aside from ex-French and British colonies in West Africa, the majority of "failing states" problems are all in the Russian sphere of influence. And interventions there could have serious diplomatic consequences.
Interventions can only really be easily made by Europe in Africa, which is also where the majority has taken place. Of course it's not automatically easy to follow up the UN, but in practice mosts missions have turned out to carry low risks.
Though that could also be luck. You can never be sure if you have a low-risk mission in the D.R. Congo. Rwanda turned out very nasty for Belgian peacekeepers.
The point about Russian sphere of influence is good. I guess in practice Eurpean defence will be mainly about interventions in Africa and (genuine) peacekeeping in the Middle East - and perhaps some scattered humanitarian missions elsewhere. Otherwise, we have to deal with Russia, or the US, or China.
Another view, of course, is that we should stop wasting our time with irrelevant conflicts in Africa, and start concentrating on those that do matter: in the European Neighbourhood (not the Russian 'near abroad', or whatever they like to call it).
10,000 people could be killed in some random war in Africa (two million have already perished in the Congo) and it would have little impact on us strategically. If the Russians invade a small country, like Georgia, it automatically has significant consequences.
There are a growing number of big fish out there in a rapidly shrinking pond. Europeans need to make sure that we are one of the biggest fish. Small fish always get eaten.
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