European Geopolitics

The abstract idea of a common European foreign policy has always seemed attractive to many. It even polls well. It is tempting to say that this attraction vanishes when we start discussing what the policy should consist of. National preferences take over, revealing that the nation state is the first-order frame in which 'high' politics is conducted, and indeed, imagined. There is ample evidence for such a view. Recently, strong evidence was provided by the inability of European countries to take a common position on the independence of Kosovo - a marginal territory on the periphery of Europe - after having had time aplenty to form such a position.

It's possible that profound differences in national preferences will disappear after a common foreign policy is imposed from the top. This would however be a slow, gradual process. And the existence of large differences provides an obstacle to the formation of an effective foreign policy, as can be witnessed by looking at the rules and details that have currently been negotiated. Under the Lisbon Treaty (which has a poor chance of succeeding), foreign policy would be conducted intergovernmentally, with a passerelle clause providing the option of moving towards majority voting at some time in the future. However, that clause does not pertain to all issues that have defence implications.

A foreign policy divorced from a defence policy has a strongly reduced spectrum of options.

The principal reason currently used to forward a common European foreign policy in the English-language discourse is Russia. Russophobia is prominent and popular on the Isles, following the assasination of Litvinenko (although it is far from clear whether the Russian government was involved), and various smaller spats. A notable background event is the recent transition of the UK from a net exporter of natural gas to a net importer, which has generated fears of energy dependence.

Aside of a common Russia policy, the challenge from India and China and the threat of international terrorism are also reasons cited. Curiously, little mention is made of a common policy towards the United States of America, even though the U.S. is doubtlessly the most influential external actor in Europe, and many of its recent actions have been highly problematic. The invasion of Iraq caused a deep split in Europe. The U.S. has been using EU territory to torture suspected terrorists. The U.S. continues to engage in bilateral deals with EU states on topics that fall within the purview of Brussels.

Even some U.S. commentators have noted the lack of a common America policy on part of the EU -- as a problem. See this column by Anne Applebaum in the Washington Post. Her reasons (needless to say if you know Applebaum) are very different from the problems mentioned above, and at times what she says comes down to 'Washington would listen if the EU selfessly offered to solve its problems for it'. But there still is a kernel of truth in her column.

The largest current issues with regard to Russia are Energy and NATO expansion, and perceptions of those issues diverge significantly between the big continental European states, the Eastern European countries, and the UK. The question of NATO membership for Georgia and the Ukraine is perceived very differently in Germany and France. They see no reason to engage in an aggressive rollback and encirclement strategy with regard to Russia, especially when there is no popular support in the Ukraine, and no reconciliation of the frozen conflicts (soon to be hot?) in Georgia.

In a hopeful and underreported sign of increasing political convergence, however, the UK government sided with Germany, France and various West European states to oppose a concrete move towards NATO membership negotiations with Georgia and the Ukraine, last April. It is not clear whether this signals agreement with Germany and France that such a move would be geopolitically undesirable, and it certainly did not reflect the views of the UK foreign policy community, which remains stuck in cold war frames.

On energy, the dominant narrative in the UK is that Europe is becoming dependent upon Russia, that Russia is playing out European countries against each other, and that the response should come through a European foreign and defence policy and a diversification of gas sources. At the same time, Germany views the energy relationship as one of mutual dependence, and thereby a way of keeping Russia tied into Europe.

A frequent problem of policies and institutions that do not exist is that they are imparted with a purpose they are unlikely to serve by those who argue on behalf of their creation. Thus does U.S. presidential candidate John McCain seek a 'League of Democracies' that would engage in bolder democracy promotion and create freer markets. Thus does Anne Applebaum dream of the leaders of the UK, France and Germany coming to the White House, pledging to solve Afghanistan. Thus, likewise, does the English foreign policy community desire a common European foreign and defence policy that will stand up to Russia.

If the differences in Europe still remain prohibitive to the formation of a common European foreign and defence policy, the EU's apparent strategy for greater integration, at least until recently, seemed to be to build support through successful 'missions'. One can think of the current peacekeeping mission in Chad, but also of the (ultimately unsuccessful) negotiations of the EU troika with Iran.

This functionalist approach also misses the point.

First, missions can go badly wrong. Second, and related, decisions to embark on foreign missions, whether diplomatic or with a military component, should not be unduly influenced by domestic political considerations. In the context of the EU, a desire to drive integration forward could be such an influence. Third, although missions can build greater trust and ability to work together, they do not automatically resolve divergent perceived interests.

Trying to find a baseline upon which common policies can be constructed would be a better procedure. But in the EU, no serious discussion of the sort is taking place. And so it will continue to muddle through.