Flexible Integration

One of the topics that keeps coming up as an alternative way 'forward' for the European Union - out of the constitutional crisis - is flexible integration.

Alternatively, this is called 'enhanced cooperation' (the legal term), a 'two-speed Europe' a 'core Europe', a 'multi-tier Europe' or a 'European avantgarde'. The different phrases reflect slightly different takes on the same theme: letting some countries achieve a higher level of integration than others.

Without a new treaty, any flexible integration will have to be in accordance with the limits set in the 'Treaty establishing the European Community' and the 'Treaty on European Union' in their current form. In particular, Article 43 of the latter contains a list of criteria. For those unwilling to read treaty texts, these criteria mainly serve to protect the current laws of the European Union, the current powers of the European Union, and the functioning of the common market.

It's good to understand this upfront, because flexible integration is often talked about without any understanding of these limits.

Ségolène Royal, for instance, seems to be ignorant of them. At least her advisor on foreign affairs (Giles Savary, who was speaking on her behalf) completely ignores the criteria.

I couldn't help gathering much the same impression from Edward Lucas' alarmist take on a two-speed Europe (via Claus Vistesen). According to Edward, there is likely to be a split between the Eurozone and those not in it. As an Eastern Europe specialist, he worries most about the effect upon the new entrants (not so much about Sweden and Denmark). He states that these will get into a similar position as Switzerland and Norway

bound by the EU's rules and standards for trade and industry, in exchange for free-trade arrangements, but with few of the other main burdens and privileges of EU membership

There will be an appreciable difference, though: the states outside the 'core' will still have a say on rules and standards, as at least product standards are an 'exclusive' power of the EU, and the functioning of the internal market is not to be hampered by enhanced cooperation. Concretely, Member States that propose enhanced cooperation can only set higher standards for their own industry, not exclude goods produced at 'lower' standards elsewhere in the EU.

On the other hand, Switzerland and Norway have to abide by the common EU standards in their exports to the EU, without having a similar say. Because trade with the EU dominates the trade of Switzerland and Norway and is at a volume which makes it inefficient to maintain different standards nationally, the EU's standards tend to just be taken over, making the countries practically part of the single market.

Edward goes further and states that a two-speed Europe could see the unravelling of the single market, but I think that's not in the cards. Within the legal framework of the EU, the possibilities for enhanced cooperation cannot lead to much loss of power of the EU in general. The only way to change it is to break up this legal framework from the get-go, which is hard to imagine. It would entail disbanding the EU and re-founding a different Union, or getting every Member State to agree to a treaty that allows the same.

The alarmism, then, is unwarranted.

But what would a two or multiple-speed Europe look like? Clive gives this one another go on Europhobia:

What the constitutional enthusiasts SHOULD be doing, if they had any sense, was proposing an alternative text that allows some countries to sign up to having an EU president, foreign minister and qualified majority voting (the key contentious issues in the current text), and others to opt out of those parts they see fit. With a bit of cunning, the details could be worked out to ensure this system works well for all - just as the Eurozone countries can operate alongside the non-Eurozone countries, all under the EU umbrella.

It’s not going to be easy, that’s for sure - but until something like this is adopted, any attempts to ratify the existing constitutional treaty are not only doomed to failure, but are also doomed to increase intra-EU resentments and tensions - perhaps to an unsustainable level.

The 'Constitution' was a mixed bag, with some provisions trying to sort out the institutional structure and other provisions providing further policy integration. Obviously, you can't fully seperate the two: a Europe with flexible integration will need a different kind of institutional structure.

A fixed two and a half year Council presidency, for instance, is not necessarily optimal. It would be better to have a fixed presidency of the of individual Councils, along the lines of the eurogroup which has Juncker as its president (now in his second term).

The Council, shortly, is divided into individual, policy-based groups. An an example, you have the Economic and Financial Affairs Council, the Environment Council, and the Competitiveness Council.

It has been found that the rotating Council presidency is non-optimal and that the solution used in the Eurogroup, which has a two-year presidency that can be prolonged for one term - works much better. This doesn't necessarily mean that the rotating presidency can best be replaced by a single presidency, though. Especially with a view to flexible integration, it would be much better to have individual presidents for each group, a single president would risk wearing more than one hat.

There is, perhaps, a deeper current to the calls for the single Council presidency, which is the desire to move towards a more political, clearer, more unified Union. At the current moment, however, what makes the EU special is not its clear, hierarchical structure but rather its ability to function in the absence of such. It is my position that we should treasure this ability and allow it to evolve through incremental improvement rather than trying to create a new, clearer order through an act of re-foundation.

Unfortunately this goes against the line of much of the EU's leaders, including the German presidency.